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A non-cooperative Pareto-efficient solution to
the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma
Haoyang Wu ∗
Abstract
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a simple model that captures the essential contradiction
between individual rationality and global rationality. Although the one-shot Pris-
oner’s Dilemma is usually viewed simple, in this paper we will categorize it into
five different types. For the type-4 Prisoner’s Dilemma game, we will propose a self-
enforcing algorithmic model to help non-cooperative agents obtain Pareto-efficient
payoffs. The algorithmic model is based on an algorithm using complex numbers
and can work in macro applications.
Key words: Prisoner’s Dilemma; Non-cooperative games.
1 Introduction
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is perhaps the most famous model in the field
of game theory. Roughly speaking, there are two sorts of PD: one-shot PD and
iterated PD. Nowadays a lot of studies on PD are focused on the latter case.
For example, Axelrod [1] investigated the evolution of cooperative behavior in
well-mixed populations of selfish agents by using PD as a paradigm. Nowak
and May [2] induced spatial structure in PD, i.e., agents were restricted to
interact with his immediate neighbors. Santos and Pacheco [3] found that when
agents interacted following scale-free networks, cooperation would become a
dominating trait throughout the entire range of parameters of PD. Perc and
Szolnoki [4] proposed that social diversity could induce cooperation as the
dominating trait throughout the entire range of parameters of PD.
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Compared with the iterated PD, the one-shot PD is usually viewed simple. In
the original version of one-shot PD, two prisoners are arrested by a policeman.
Each prisoner must independently choose a strategy between “Confessing”
(denoted as strategy “Defect”) and “Not confessing” (denoted as strategy
“Cooperate”). The payoff matrix of prisoners is shown in Table 1. As long as
two agents are rational, the unique Nash equilibrium shall be (Defect, Defect),
which results in a Pareto-inefficient payoff (P, P ). That is the dilemma.
Table 1: The payoff matrix of PD, where T > R > P > S, and R > (T +S)/2.
The first entry in the parenthesis denotes the payoff of agent 1 and the second
entry stands for the payoff of agent 2.
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
agent 1
agent 2
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate (R, R) (S, T)
Defect (T, S) (P, P)
In 1999, Eisert et al [5] proposed a quantum model of one-shot PD (denoted as
EWL model). The EWL model showed “quantum advantages” as a result of a
novel quantum Nash equilibrium, which help agents reach the Pareto-efficient
payoff (R,R). Hence, the agents escape the dilemma. In 2002, Du et al [6]
gave an experiment to carry out the EWL model.
So far, there are some criticisms on EWL model: 1) It is a new game which
has new rules and thus has no implications on the original one-shot PD [7]. 2)
The quantum state serves as a binding contract which let the players chooses
one of the two possible moves (Cooperate or Defect) of the original game. 3)
In the full three-parameter strategy space, there is no such quantum Nash
equilibrium [8] [9].
Besides these criticisms, here we add another criticism: in the EWL model,
the arbitrator is required to perform quantum measurements to readout the
messages of agents. This requirement is unreasonable for common macro dis-
ciplines such as politics and economics, because the arbitrator should play a
neutral role in the game: His reasonable actions should only receive agents’
strategies and assign payoffs to agents. Put differently, if the arbitrator is
willing to work with an additional quantum equipment which helps agents to
obtain the Pareto-efficient payoffs (R,R), then why does not he directly assign
the Pareto-efficient payoffs to the agents?
Motivated by these criticisms, this paper aims to investigate whether a Pareto-
efficient outcome can be reached by non-cooperative agents in macro applica-
tions. Note that a non-cooperative game is one in which players make decisions
independently. Thus, while they may be able to cooperate, any cooperation
must be self-enforcing [10].
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we will propose
an algorithmic model, where the arbitrator does not have to work with some
additional quantum equipment (Note: here we do not aim to solve the first
three criticisms on the EWL model, because these criticisms are irrelevant to
the algorithmic model). In Section 3, we will categorize the one-shot PD into
five different types, and claim that the agents can self-enforcingly reach the
Pareto-efficient outcome for the case of type-4 PD by using the algorithmic
model. The Section 4 gives some discussions. The last section draws conclusion.
2 An algorithmic model
As we have pointed out above, for macro applications, it is unreasonable to
require the arbitrator act with some additional quantum equipment. In what
follows, firstly we will amend the EWL model such that the arbitrator works
in the same way as he does in classical environments, then we will propose an
algorithmic version of the amended EWL model.
2.1 The amended EWL model
Let the set of two agents be N = {1, 2}. Following formula (4) in Ref. [9],
two-parameter quantum strategies are drawn from the set:
ωˆ(θ, φ) ≡


eiφ cos(θ/2) i sin(θ/2)
i sin(θ/2) e−iφ cos(θ/2)

 ,
Ωˆ ≡ {ωˆ(θ, φ) : θ ∈ [0, pi], φ ∈ [0, pi/2]}, Jˆ ≡ cos(γ/2)Iˆ ⊗ Iˆ + i sin(γ/2)σˆx ⊗ σˆx
(where γ is an entanglement measure, σˆx is the Pauli matrix, ⊗ is tensor
product), Iˆ ≡ ωˆ(0, 0), Dˆ ≡ ωˆ(pi, pi/2), Cˆ ≡ ωˆ(0, pi/2).
Without loss of generality, we assume:
1) Each agent j ∈ N has a quantum coin (qubit), a classical card and a chan-
nel connected to the arbitrator. The basis vectors |C〉 = [1, 0]T , |D〉 = [0, 1]T
of a quantum coin denote head up and tail up respectively.
2) Each agent j ∈ N independently performs a local unitary operation on
his/her own quantum coin. The set of agent j’s operation is Ωˆj = Ωˆ. A
strategic operation chosen by agent j is denoted as ωˆj ∈ Ωˆj . If ωˆj = Iˆ, then
ωˆj(|C〉) = |C〉, ωˆj(|D〉) = |D〉; If ωˆj = Dˆ, then ωˆj(|C〉) = |D〉, ωˆj(|D〉) = |C〉.
Iˆ denotes “Not flip”, Dˆ denotes “Flip”.
3) The two sides of a card are denoted as Side 0 and Side 1. The messages writ-
ten on the Side 0 (or Side 1) of card j is denoted as card(j, 0) (or card(j, 1)).
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Fig. 1. The setup of the A-EWL model. Each agent has a quantum 
coin and a classical card.  Each agent independently performs a local 
unitary operation on his/her own quantum coin. 
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card(j, 0) represents “Cooperate”, and card(j, 1) represents “Defect”.
4) There is a device that can measure the state of two quantum coins and
send messages to the designer.
Fig. 1 shows the amended version of EWL model (denoted as the A-EWL
model). Its working steps are defined as follows:
Step 1: The state of each quantum coin is set as |C〉. The initial state of the
two quantum coins is |ψ0〉 = |CC〉.
Step 2: Let the two quantum coins be entangled by Jˆ . |ψ1〉 = Jˆ |CC〉.
Step 3: Each agent j independently performs a local unitary operation ωˆj on
his own quantum coin. |ψ2〉 = [ωˆ1 ⊗ ωˆ2]Jˆ |CC〉.
Step 4: Let the two quantum coins be disentangled by Jˆ+. |ψ3〉 = Jˆ+[ωˆ1 ⊗
ωˆ2]Jˆ |CC〉.
Step 5: The device measures the state of the two quantum coins and sends
card(j, 0) (or card(j, 1)) as the message mj to the arbitrator if the collapsed
state of quantum coin j is |C〉 (or |D〉).
Step 8: The arbitrator receives the overall message m = (m1, m2) and assigns
payoffs to the two agents according to Table 1. END.
In the A-EWL model, the assumed device performs quantum measurements
and sends messages to the arbitrator on behalf of agents. Thus, the arbitra-
tor needs not work with an additional quantum equipment as EWL model
requires, i.e., the arbitrator works in the same way as before. It should be em-
phasized that the A-EWL model does not aim to solve the criticisms on the
EWL model as specified in the Introduction. We propose the A-EWL model
only for the following simulation process, which is a key part of the algorithmic
model.
Since quantum operations can be simulated classically by using complex num-
bers, the A-EWL model can also be simulated. In what follows we will give
matrix representations of quantum states and then propose an algorithmic
version of A-EWL model.
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2.2 Matrix representations of quantum states
In quantum mechanics, a quantum state can be described as a vector. For a
two-level system, there are two basis vectors: [1, 0]T and [0, 1]T . In the begin-
ning, we define:
|CC〉 = [1, 0, 0, 0]T , |CD〉 = [0, 1, 0, 0]T , |DC〉 = [0, 0, 1, 0]T , |DD〉 = [0, 0, 0, 1]T .
Jˆ =


cos(γ/2) 0 0 i sin(γ/2)
0 cos(γ/2) i sin(γ/2) 0
0 i sin(γ/2) cos(γ/2) 0
i sin(γ/2) 0 0 cos(γ/2)


, γ ∈ [0, pi/2].
For γ = pi/2,
Jˆpi/2 =
1√
2


1 0 0 i
0 1 i 0
0 i 1 0
i 0 0 1


, Jˆ+pi/2 =
1√
2


1 0 0 −i
0 1 −i 0
0 −i 1 0
−i 0 0 1


,
where Jˆ+pi/2 is the conjugate of Jˆpi/2.
Definition 1: ψ1 ≡ Jˆ |CC〉 =


cos(γ/2)
0
0
i sin(γ/2)


.
Since only two values in ψ1 are non-zero, we only need to calculate the leftmost
and rightmost column of ωˆ1 ⊗ ωˆ2 to derive ψ2 = [ωˆ1 ⊗ ωˆ2]ψ1.
Definition 2: ψ3 ≡ Jˆ+ψ2.
Suppose ψ3 = [η1, · · · , η4]T , let ∆ = [|η1|2, · · · , |η4|2]. It can be easily checked
that Jˆ , ωˆ1, ωˆ2 and Jˆ
+ are all unitary matrices. Hence, |ψ3|2 = 1. Thus, ∆ can
be viewed as a probability distribution over the states {|CC〉, |CD〉, |DC〉, |DD〉}.
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2.3 An algorithmic model
Based on the matrix representations of quantum states, here we will propose an
algorithmic model that simulates the A-EWL model. Since the entanglement
measurement γ is a control factor, it can be simply set as its maximum pi/2.
The input and output of the algorithmic model are shown in Fig. 2. A Matlab
program is shown in Fig. 3(a)-(d).
Input:
1) ξj, φj, j = 1, 2: the parameters of agent j’s local operation ωˆj, ξj ∈
[0, pi], φj ∈ [0, pi/2].
2) card(j, 0), card(j, 1), j = 1, 2: the messages written on the two sides of agent
j’s card. card(j, 0) and card(j, 1) represent Cooperate and Defect respectively.
Output:
mj ∈ {card(j, 0), card(j, 1)}, j = 1, 2: agent j’s message that is sent to the
arbitrator.
Procedures of the algorithmic model:
Step 1: Reading two parameters ξj and φj from each agent j (See Fig. 3(a)).
Step 2: Computing the leftmost and rightmost columns of ωˆ1 ⊗ ωˆ2 (See Fig.
3(b)).
Step 3: Computing ψ2 = [ωˆ1 ⊗ ωˆ2]Jˆpi/2|CC〉, ψ3 = Jˆ+pi/2ψ2, and the probability
distribution ∆ (See Fig. 3(c)).
Step 4: Randomly choosing a state from the set of all four possible states
{|CC〉, |CD〉, |DC〉, |DD〉} according to the probability distribution ∆.
Step 5: For each j ∈ I, the computer sends card(j, 0) (or card(j, 1)) as message
mj to the arbitrator through channel j if the j-th element of the chosen state
is |C〉 (or |D〉) (See Fig. 3(d)).
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3 Five types of one-shot PD
Since its beginning, PD has been generalized to many disciplines such as pol-
itics, economics, sociology, biology and so on. Despite these widespread ap-
plications, people seldom care how the payoffs of agents are determined. For
example, Axelrod [1] used the word “yield” to describe how the agents ob-
tained the payoffs. Nowak and May [2] used the word “get”, and Santos and
Pacheco [3] used the word “receive” respectively.
One may think that such question looks trivial at first sight. However, as we
will show in this section, there exists an interesting story behind this question.
In what follows, we will categorize the one-shot PD into five different types.
Type-1 PD:
1) There are two agents and no arbitrator in the game.
2) The strategies of agents are actions performed by agents. The agents’ payoffs
are determined by the outcomes of these actions and satisfy Table 1.
For example, let us neglect the United Nation and consider two countries (e.g.,
US and Russia) confronted the problem of nuclear disarmament. The strat-
egy Cooperate means “Obeying disarmament”, and Defect means “Refusing
disarmament”. If the payoff matrix confronted by the two countries satisfies
Table 1, the nuclear disarmament game is a type-1 PD.
Type-2 PD:
1) There are two agents and an arbitrator in the game.
2) The strategies of agents are actions performed by agents. The arbitrator
observes the outcomes of actions and assign payoffs to the agents according
to Table 1.
For example, let us consider a taxi game. Suppose there are two taxi drivers
and a manager. Two drivers drive a car in turn, one in day and the other in
night. The car’s status will be very good, ok or common if the number of drivers
who maintain the car is two, one or zero respectively. The manager observes
the car’s status and assigns rewards R2, R1, R0 to each driver respectively,
where R2 > R1 > R0. The whole cost of maintenance is c. Let the strategy
Cooperate denote “Maintain”, and Defect denote “Not maintain”. The payoff
matrix can be represented as Table 2. If Table 2 satisfies the conditions in
Table 1, the taxi game is a type-2 PD.
Table 2: The payoff matrix of type-2 PD.
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❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
agent 1
agent 2
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate (R2 − c/2, R2 − c/2) (R1 − c, R1)
Defect (R1, R1 − c) (R0, R0)
Type-3 PD:
1) There are two agents and an arbitrator in the game.
2) The strategy of each agent is not an action, but a message that can be sent
to the arbitrator through a channel. The arbitrator receives two messages and
assign payoffs to the agents according to Table 1.
3) Two agents cannot communicate with each other.
For example, suppose two agents are arrested separately and required to report
their crime information to the arbitrator through two channels independently.
If the arbitrator assigns payoffs to agents according to Table 1, this game is a
type-3 PD.
Type-4 PD:
Conditions 1-2 are the same as those in type-3 PD.
3) Two agents can communicate with each other.
4) Before sending messages to the arbitrator, two agents can construct the
algorithmic model specified in Fig. 2. Each agent j can observe whether the
other agent participates the algorithmic model or not: whenever the other
agent takes back his channel, agent j will do so and sends his message mj to
the arbitrator directly.
Remark 1 : At first sight, the conditions of type-4 PD is complicated. How-
ever, these conditions are not restrictive when the arbitrator communicate
with agents indirectly and cannot separate them. For example, suppose the
arbitrator and agents are connected by Internet, then all conditions of type-4
PD can be satisfied in principle.
The type-4 PD works in the following way:
Stage 1: (Actions of two agents) For each agent j ∈ N , he faces two strategies:
• S(j, 0): Participate the algorithmic model, i.e., leave his channel to the com-
puter, and submit ξj, φj, card(j, 0), card(j, 1) to the computer;
• S(j, 1): Not participate the algorithmic model, i.e., take back his channel,
and submit mj to the arbitrator directly.
According to condition 4, the algorithmic model is triggered if and only if both
two agents participate it.
Stage 2: (Actions of the arbitrator) The arbitrator receives two messages and
assigns payoffs to agents according to Table 1.
In type-4 PD, from the viewpoints of the arbitrator, he acts in the same way
as before, i.e., nothing is changed. However, the payoff matrix confronted by
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two agents is now changed to Table 3. For each entry of Table 3, we give the
corresponding explanation as follows:
Table 3: The payoff matrix of two agents by constructing the algorithmic model,
where R,P are defined in Table 1, R > P .
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
agent 1
agent 2
S(2, 0) S(2, 1)
S(1, 0) (R, R) (P, P)
S(1, 1) (P, P) (P, P)
1) (S(1, 0), S(2, 0)): This strategy profile means two agents both participate
the algorithmic model and submit parameters to the computer. According
to Ref. [5], for each agent j ∈ N , his dominant parameters are ξj = 0 and
φj = pi/2, which result in a Pareto-efficient payoff (R,R).
2) (S(1, 0), S(2, 1)): This strategy profile means agent 1 participates the algo-
rithmic model, but agent 2 takes back his channel and submits a message to
the arbitrator directly. Since agent 1 can observe agent 2’s action, in the end,
both agents will take back their channels and submit messages to the arbi-
trator directly. Obviously, the dominant message of each agent j is card(j, 1),
and the arbitrator will assign the Pareto-inefficient payoff (P, P ) to agents.
3) (S(1, 1), S(2, 0)): This strategy profile is similar to the above case. The ar-
bitrator will assign (P, P ) to two agents.
4) (S(1, 1), S(2, 1)): This strategy profile means two agents both take back
their channels and send messages to the arbitrator directly. This case is simi-
lar to the case 2. The arbitrator will assign (P, P ) to two agents.
From Table 3, it can be seen that (S(1, 0), S(2, 0)) and (S(1, 1), S(2, 1)) are two
Nash equilibria, and the former is Pareto-efficient. As specified by Telser (Page
28, Line 2, [11]), “A party to a self-enforcing agreement calculates whether his
gain from violating the agreement is greater or less than the loss of future net
benefits that he would incur as a result of detection of his violation and the con-
sequent termination of the agreement by the other party.” Since two channels
have been controlled by the computer in Stage 1, in the end (S(1, 0), S(2, 0))
is a self-enforcing Nash equilibrium and the Pareto-efficient payoff (R,R) is
the unique Nash equilibrium outcome. In this sense, the two agents escape the
dilemma.
Type-5 PD:
Conditions 1-3 are the same as those in type-4 PD.
4) The last condition of type-4 PD does not hold.
For this case, although the two agents can communicate before moving and
agree that collaboration is good for each agent, they will definitely choose
(Defect, Defect) as if they are separated. Thus, the agents cannot escape the
dilemma.
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4 Discussions
The algorithmic model revises common understanding on the one-shot PD.
Here we will discuss some possible doubts about it.
Q1 : The type-4 PD seems to be a cooperative game because in condition 4,
the algorithmic model constructed by two agents acts as a correlation between
agents.
A1 : From the viewpoints of agents, the game is different from the original
one-shot PD, since the payoff matrix confronted by the two agents has been
changed from Table 1 to Table 3. But from the viewpoints of the arbitra-
tor, nothing is changed. Thus, the so-called correlation between two agents is
indeed unobservable to the arbitrator. Put differently, the arbitrator cannot
prevent agents from constructing the algorithmic model.
On the other hand, since each agent can freely choose not to participate the
algorithmic model and send a message to the arbitrator directly in Stage 1,
the algorithmic model is self-enforcing and thus still a non-cooperative game.
Q2 : After the algorithmic model is triggered, can it simply send (card(1, 0),
card(2, 0)) to the arbitrator instead of running Steps 1-5?
A2 : The algorithmic model enlarges each agent’s strategy space from the orig-
inal strategy space {Cooperate, Defect} to a two-dimensional strategy space
[0, pi]× [0, pi/2], and generates the Pareto-efficient payoff (R,R) in Nash equi-
librium. The enlarged strategy space includes the original strategy space of
one-shot PD: the strategy (Cooperate, Cooperate), (Cooperate, Defect), (De-
fect, Cooperate), (Defect, Defect) in the original PD correspond to the strategy
((0, 0), (0, 0)), ((0, 0), (pi, pi/2)), ((pi, pi/2), (0, 0)), ((pi, pi/2), (pi, pi/2)) in the al-
gorithmic model respectively, since Iˆ = ωˆ(0, 0), Dˆ = ωˆ(pi, pi/2).
However, the idea in this question restricts each agent’s strategy space from
the original strategy space {Cooperate, Defect} to a single strategy Cooperate.
In this sense, two agents are required to sign a binding contract to do so. This
is beyond the range of non-cooperative game.
Remark 2 : The algorithmic model is not suitable for type-1 and type-2 PD,
because the computer cannot perform actions on behalf of agents. The algo-
rithmic model is not applicable for type-3 PD either because two agents are
separated, thereby the algorithmic model cannot be constructed. For the case
of type-5 PD, the algorithmic model is not applicable because condition 4 in
type-4 PD is vital and indispensable.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we categorize the well-known one-shot PD into five types and
propose an algorithmic model to help two non-cooperative agents self-enforcingly
escape a special type of PD, i.e., the type-4 PD. The type-4 PD is justified
when the arbitrator communicate with the agents indirectly through some
channels, and each agent’s strategy is not an action, but a message that can
be sent to the arbitrator. With the rapid development of Internet, more and
more type-4 PD games will be seen.
One point is important for the novel result: Usually people may think the two
payoff matrices confronted by agents and the arbitrator are the same (i.e.,
Table 1). However we argue that for the case of type-4 PD, the two payoff
matrices can be different: The arbitrator still faces Table 1, but the agents
can self-enforcingly change their payoff matrix to Table 3 by virtue of the
algorithmic model, which leads to a Pareto-efficient payoff.
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%************************************************************
%     A Matlab program of the algorithmic model
%************************************************************
% Defining the array of   
xi=zeros(2,1);
phi=zeros(2,1);
% Reading agent 1's parameters              . For example,
xi(1)=0;
phi(1)=pi/2;
% Reading agent 2's parameters              . For example, 
xi(2)=0;
phi(2)=pi/2;
)2/,0(ˆˆˆ1 piωω ==C
)2/,0(ˆˆˆ2 piωω ==C
2,1),,( =jjj φξ
),( 11 φξ
),( 22 φξ
Fig. 3 (a). Reading each agent j's parameters      and                  . jξ 2,1, =jjφ
Fig. 3 (b). Computing the leftmost and rightmost columns of
% Defining two 2*2 matrices A and B
A=zeros(2,2);
B=zeros(2,2);
% Let A represents the local operation of agent 1.
A(1,1)=exp(i*phi(1))*cos(xi(1)/2);
A(1,2)=i*sin(xi(1)/2);
A(2,1)=A(1,2);
A(2,2)=exp(-i*phi(1))*cos(xi(1)/2);
% Let B represents the local operation of agent 2.
B(1,1)=exp(i*phi(2))*cos(xi(2)/2);
B(1,2)=i*sin(xi(2)/2);
B(2,1)=B(1,2);
B(2,2)=exp(-i*phi(2))*cos(xi(2)/2);
% Computing the leftmost and rightmost columns of 
C=zeros(4, 2);
for row=1 : 2
C((row-1)*2+1, 1) = A(row,1) * B(1,1);
C((row-1)*2+2, 1) = A(row,1) * B(2,1);
C((row-1)*2+1, 2) = A(row,2) * B(1,2);
C((row-1)*2+2, 2) = A(row,2) * B(2,2);
end
A=C;
% Now the matrix A contains the leftmost and rightmost columns of
1ωˆ
21
ˆˆ ωω ⊗
2ωˆ
21
ˆˆ ωω ⊗
21
ˆˆ ωω ⊗
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Fig. 3 (c). Computing            ,    .
% Computing 
psi2=zeros(4,1);
for row=1 : 4
psi2(row)=(A(row,1)+A(row,2)*i)/sqrt(2);
end
% Computing 
psi3=zeros(4,1);
for row=1 : 4
psi3(row)=(psi2(row) - i*psi2(5-row))/sqrt(2);
end
% Computing the probability distribution
distribution=psi3.*conj(psi3);
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% Randomly choosing a state according to the probability distribution
random_number=rand;
temp=0;
for index=1: 4
temp = temp + distribution(index);
if temp >= random_number
break;
end
end
% indexstr: a binary representation of the index of the chosen state
%   ‘0’ stands for      , ‘1’ stands for  
indexstr=dec2bin(index-1);
sizeofindexstr=size(indexstr);
% Defining an array of messages for two agents
message=cell(2,1);
% For each agent          , the algorithmic model generates the message
for index=1 : 2 - sizeofindexstr(2)
    message{index,1}=strcat('card(',int2str(index),',0)');
end
for index=1 : sizeofindexstr(2)
    if indexstr(index)=='0'       % Note: ‘0’ stands for  
        message{2-sizeofindexstr(2)+index,1}=strcat('card(',int2str(2-sizeofindexstr(2)+index),',0)');
else
        message{2-sizeofindexstr(2)+index,1}=strcat('card(',int2str(2-sizeofindexstr(2)+index),',1)');
end
end
% Outputing the messages           to the arbitrator
for index=1:2
disp(message(index));
end
∆
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